Wiretap Evidence Inadmissible in Civil Cases Without Consent of One Communicant by Casuso, Carlos E.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
7-1-1973
Wiretap Evidence Inadmissible in Civil Cases
Without Consent of One Communicant
Carlos E. Casuso
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carlos E. Casuso, Wiretap Evidence Inadmissible in Civil Cases Without Consent of One Communicant, 27 U. Miami L. Rev. 535 (1973)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol27/iss3/16
CASES NOTED
tion that municipal regulation of rates, collection practices, and termi-
nation practices may cause the utility to be so entwined with government
as to lose its private status. However, courts will not hold that merely
because a utility is pervasively regulated, any action taken by it is under
"color of law." Only those activities which are subject to state regulation
will be deemed "state action." Hattell, of necessity, was limited to the
issue of what constituted state action and did not address the question
of what was needed to conform to due process. Due process, when taken
from principle to practice, demands only that what is available to the
individual be fundamentally fair in light of the circumstances. No doubt,
implementation of due process requirements will be a fertile source of
future litigation.
JOHN D. SCHMELZER
WIRETAP EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE IN CIVIL CASES
WITHOUT CONSENT OF ONE
COMMUNICANT
A wife brought an action for the dissolution of her marriage. During
the presentation of testimony on the issue of temporary child custody, her
husband offered in evidence recordings of intercepted telephone conversa-
tions he had obtained by tapping two telephone lines coming into the
home of the parties.' The wife filed a motion to suppress the intercepted
wire communications,2 but the trial court denied the motion.8 On appeal,
the District Court of Appeal, First District, reversing the trial court,
held that the statutory and constitutional law of the State of Florida
precludes the admissibility of intercepted wire communications unless the
interception be by consent of one of the parties to the conversation, or by
authorization of a court of competent jurisdiction.4 The Florida Supreme
Court held, affirmed: The decision of the district court is adopted with
the addition that the statute in question5 makes no exception which allows
the admission of wiretap evidence in domestic relation cases in which
neither party to the communication has consented to the interception.
Markham v. Markham, 272 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1973).
1. The husband and wife owned, as tenants by the entireties, the marital home. One
of the telephones tapped was listed in the husband's name. The second telephone in the
home is an extension of a phone installed in the "Nancy Markham School of Dance."
2. The wife relied on the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518 (1970), and FLA. STAT. § 934.06 (1971).
3. The trial judge preserved to the wife the right to object to portions of the recordings
only on grounds of relevancy or materiality.
4. Markham v. Markham, 265 So.2d 59 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1972). In light of the supreme
court's adoption by reference of the district court of appeal's decision, citation to portions
of the case herein will be to the district court's opinion.
S. FLA. STAT. § 934.01 (1971).
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In criminal cases evidence which has been obtained by means of
wiretapping devices has generally been found to have been illegally ob-
tained and, therefore, inadmissible.' Although the exclusion of such
evidence has been uniform in criminal actions, its admissibility in non-
criminal proceedings varies among jurisdictions and according to the type
of case involved."
Markham presented to the supreme court a novel question. Although
the Florida "Security of Communications" statute provides its own exclu-
sionary rule,8 its applicability was apparently intended to be confined to
criminal matters.' In the instant case the problem facing the supreme
court was one of statutory construction. The court viewed the statute0
as "amplifying" the constitutional guarantee" against the "unreasonable
interception of private communications." 2 This statutory amplification
was strictly construed. The court in Markham interpreted the statute to
allow interception of communications if either of two prerequisites were
met: Either one of the parties to the communication could consent to the
interception, or the interception could be authorized by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction. 8
The Court authorization would apparently not be available in a
factual situation like Markham. Sections 934.01 and 934.07 of the
Florida Statutes expressly limit court authorization to certain types of
major crimes,' 4 and such authorization is to be issued only when applica-
tion has been made by a law enforcement agency having the responsibility
to prosecute such crimes.'5 The legality and admissibility of such inter-
6. E.g. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914).
7. For a discussion of the admissibility of such evidence in civil cases see Note, Ad-
missibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence in Noncriminal Proceedings, 22 FLA. L. REV. 38
(1969).
8. FLA. STAT. § 934.06 (1971). The pertinent part of the statute reads: "Whenever any
wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of such communi-
cation and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing,
or other proceeding in or before any court ... .
9. The statute is found in FLA. STAT. Title 45 (1971), encompassing §§ 900-42, which
relates to criminal procedure.
10. The court in its opinion relied on FLA. STAT. § 934.01(4) (1971). The statute reads
in part: "To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of wire or oral
communications when none of the parties to the communication has consented to the inter-
ception should be allowed only when authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction."
11. FLA. CONST. DECL. op RIGHTS § 12 (1968).
12. Markham v. Markham, 265 So.2d 59, 61 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
13. Id. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(d) (1971) provides that it is not unlawful for a person
to intercept his own oral communication or to intercept a communication when one of
the parties thereto has previously consented. See United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888
(2d Cir. 1940) (Hand, J. suggesting that the rationale of implied consent can be used to
handle such problems).
14. FLA. STAT. § 934.07 (1971) provides that court authorization may be issued when
the interception may provide evidence of the commission of the offense of murder, kid-
napping, gambling, robbery, burglary, grand larceny, prostitution, criminal usury, abortion,
bribery, extortion, dealing in narcotics or dangerous drugs, or any conspiracy to commit any
of the above stated offenses.
15. Id.
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cepted communications depended, then, solely on whether one of the
parties thereto had consented. In Markham, consent by the parties to
the intercepted communications was clearly lacking."6
One final issue was presented in Markham. The husband argued
that the interest reflected in his right to protect his marital relation
was not intended to be curtailed by the statute. In People v. Appelbaum,7
a New York court noted that the right of privacy may be subordinated
to the paramount right of the subscriber-husband who authorized the
use of the phone.18 Such paramount rights include, among other things,
the right to determine whether the use of the telephone line is to the
detriment of the husband's marital relationship. The New York court
stated that "the act of one having his own wire tapped to vindicate
these paramount rights is not within the scope of the [exclusionary rule]
statute or the objectives sought to be reached by its enactment."'"
The Markham decision rejected the Appelbaum rationale. The dis-
trict court pointed out that the subject statute made no exception allow-
ing a subscriber-husband to wiretap. "[A] husband does not possess the
right to invade his wife's right to privacy by utilizing electronic devices."20
The court refused to subordinate the rights of a wife to those of her
husband, and it rejected the common law concept that a husband is the
head of the household. The opinion points out that
[a] married woman is no longer her husband's chattel ...
[H]er rights are as paramount as his .... They now occupy a
position as equal partners in the family relationship. . . . A
husband has no more right to tap a telephone located in the
marital home than has a wife to tap a telephone situated in the
husband's office. 2'
It was to this reasoning that Judge Wigginton dissented. Wigginton's
dissent subscribed to the Appelbaum rationale 2 and to the principle
which "recognized the husband of a marriage to be the head of his house-
hold, which carries with it the privilege and duty of protecting it against
injury, harm, or the threat thereof. ' 25
16. Markham v. Markham, 265 So.2d 59, 61-62 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
17. 227 App. Div. 43, 97 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Appelbaum].
Appelbaum dealt with the criminal prosecution of a husband who had tapped his own
telephone to record his wife's conversations. The statute involved therein is similar to
the Florida "Security of Communications" statute. FLA. STAT. ch. 934 (1971); see notes
10 and 12 supra. For a discussion of state law on wiretapping see Greenwalt, The Consent
Problem in Wiretapping & Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring with the Consent of a
Participant in a Conversation, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 189 (1968).
18. People v. Appelbaum, 277 App. Div. 43, 44, 97 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (1950).
19. Id. at 45, 97 N.Y.S.2d at 810. Accord, Erlich v. Erlich, 278 App. Div. 244, 104
N.Y.S.2d 531 (1951); Commonwealth v. McCoy, 442 Pa. 234, 275 A.2d 28 (1971); Com-
monwealth v. Goldberg, 208 Pa. Super. 513, 224 A.2d 91 (1966).
20. Markham v. Markham, 265 So.2d 59, 62 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
21. Id.
22. 277 App. Div. 43, 44, 97 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (1950).
23. Markham v. Markham, 265 So.2d 59, 62 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
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The dissent in the supreme court decision was based on the principle
that a wife, within the confines of the marital home, could not have a
reasonable right to expect that such communication would be free from
interception. This opinion also resorted to the argument that a wife's
right to privacy is subordinate to the husband's right and duty to protect
the marital home.24
The majority opinion in the supreme court decision reflects a
reluctance to incorporate the Appelbaum exception25 into the "Security
of Communications" statute,20 and simply provides a strict construction
of the statute. It is likely that the impact of the case will be restricted
to its facts. However, in light of the rationale of the court, the decision
could very well set precedent for all noncriminal proceedings, in which
intercepted communications obtained in violation of "Security of Com-
munications" statute are sought to be introduced into evidence.
It is the writer's opinion that the court properly rejected the rea-
soning in Appelbaum and recognized a wife's right to privacy in her
communications. It would have been an anachronism for the court to
subordinate a wife's right to privacy at a time in our society when women
are finally being recognized as the equals of men. The right to privacy
is of such importance that it should not be diluted by antiquated and
obsolete social norms. Markham is not to be interpreted to say that all
illegally obtained evidence will be inadmissible in Florida, but the appli-
cation to a civil matter of a statute obviously designed to affect criminal
proceedings, in order to preserve an individual's right to privacy, is
clearly an indication of the court's attitude toward the admissibility of
evidence obtained in derogation of a person's right to privacy.
CAu.Los E. CASUSO
"ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO GIANT STEPS BACKWARD"
-THE COURT LOOKS AT STUDENT RIGHTS
Central Connecticut State College1 allows only those student orga-
nizations officially recognized by the college to use campus facilities for
meetings and other non-college sponsored activities. The petitioners, a
group of students, sought to gain official recognition for an organization
to be known as "A Local Chapter of Students for a Democratic Society."2
Following the established procedures of the college,' the petitioners
24. Markham v. Markham, 272 So.2d 813, 814-15 (Fla. 1973).
25. 277 App. Div. 43, 44, 97 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (1950).
26. FLA. STAT. ch. 934 (1971).
1. A state supported university located at New Britain, Connecticut [hereinafter re-
ferred to as "the College"].
2. Hereinafter referred to as "S.D.S."
3. The university procedures briefly were as follows: An application was submitted to
